Dynamic dilemma of political trust
构建静态和动态选举竞争模型，研究政治信任如何影响利益集团政治，发现高信任度使利益集团在选举中俘获政治家，形成信任与特殊利益政治的周期性循环。
Abstract While special interest politics has been shown to undermine political trust, less is known about how political trust influences special interest politics. We construct a static electoral competition model in which candidates propose policy platforms and an interest group determines the level of campaign contributions. We show that a high level of trust in politicians allows the interest group to capture politicians during elections, creating a dynamic dilemma of political trust. Extending the model to a dynamic framework with short-lived players, we find that this dilemma can lead to cycles of political trust and special interest politics: political trust is accumulated, consumed, and then restored, following cycles of special interest politics..