A Shared Interest: Do Bonds Strengthen Equity Monitoring?
研究发现，当机构投资者持有公司债券比例较高时，他们会更积极地进行治理研究，更少跟随代理顾问的投票建议，表明债券持有增强了股权监督动机。
Abstract Institutional investors conduct more governance research and are less likely to follow proxy advisor vote recommendations when a company’s bonds comprise a larger share of their assets. These findings are driven by bond holdings, shareholder proposals, and companies where fixed-income managers are more likely to be attentive and share an interest with equity investors in improving governance. The findings do not concentrate on companies or shareholder proposals where creditor–shareholder conflicts are likely. Overall, the findings suggest that corporate bond holdings influence how actively institutions monitor their equity positions and contribute to institutions’ overall incentive to be engaged stewards.