Powers and Practices in Labor Standards Enforcement
研究发现美国各州劳动部门普遍未充分利用法定执法权力，而战略性执法实践能显著降低最低工资违规概率，但对最弱势工人群体效果有限。
ABSTRACT Wage theft remains a pervasive problem internationally and within the United States. In response, worker advocates have sought stronger laws to deter violations and promote compliance. Yet formal authority alone may be insufficient; labor departments often fail to use the full extent of their legal authority to conduct vigorous enforcement. This raises two empirical questions: to what extent do agencies deploy available enforcement tools, and with what consequences? Drawing on a novel survey of U.S. state labor departments, new measures of statutory strength in wage‐hour laws, and state‐level estimates of minimum wage violations, we find widespread nonuse of available powers. This misalignment of powers and practices has substantive consequences: the predicted probability of minimum wage violation falls sharply as strategic enforcement practices increase, conditional on strong labor laws. However, this effect shows no measurable impact for some of the most vulnerable workers, suggesting limits in reaching those at greatest risk. We conclude by outlining a forward‐looking research agenda on the (mis)alignment of powers and practices.