Returnable-after-deep-trial policies in e-commerce supply chains with opportunistic consumers
研究了在线卖家在代理销售和转售模式下，面对机会主义消费者时是否采用深度试用后可退货（RADT）策略的定价与退货决策，发现RADT对消费者成本高，但卖家可能通过鼓励机会主义行为获利。
In response to consumer desire for a deep experience of product performance, some online sellers have strengthened their traditional money back guarantee by implementing the “returnable after a deep trial” (RADT) policy. But such a policy has also encouraged opportunistic behavior. Considering such opportunistic behavior for consumers, we build an e-commerce supply chain model to investigate the price decisions and the return strategy (implementing RADT or not) of online sellers under two selling modes: agency selling and reselling. We show that the RADT is often expensive for consumers. Besides, counterintuitively, when the online seller allows for an increased degree of deep trial, the seller is highly likely to decrease the retail price and the refund amount, simultaneously. Moreover, opportunistic consumers also have strategic value: although consumers’ opportunistic behavior under the RADT seemingly harms the online seller, in fact, the seller may generate profits by strategically encouraging opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, under agency selling, when consumers’ benefit from opportunistic behavior is not extremely small, and most ordinary consumers directly return the product, the RADT is optimal; while under reselling, the RADT is optimal if most ordinary consumers directly return the product. Surprisingly, more opportunistic consumers increase the online seller’s incentive to adopt the RADT policy.