Transaction Governance: Firm-Level Influences and the Organizational Identity Paradox
提出交易治理的概念框架，将组织身份取向融入交易成本经济学模型，分析身份取向如何影响企业对正式与非正式治理机制的选择，并探讨交易结果如何反过来塑造身份取向，揭示其中的悖论。
We propose a conceptual framework of transaction governance that augments the existing transaction cost economics (TCE) model with research on organizational identity orientation. Our focus is on how particular identity orientations imply preferences for formal versus informal governance mechanisms. These preferences, in turn, are activated when a firm faces particular transaction hazards. In general, the identity orientation construct augments the current perspective on governance choice and helps expand the current TCE model. We also discuss how a firm’s identity orientation is itself systematically shaped (strengthened or weakened) by transactional outcomes. These feedback processes involve certain paradoxes. For instance, even successfully governed transactions may actually weaken a firm’s identity orientation, to the extent that the governance choice is incompatible with the firm’s prevailing identity orientation.