Outcomes, risk-taking, and incentives: Evidence from asset managers
研究了挪威资产管理公司的激励合约，发现基于量化指标（如信息比率）的高额奖金能提升年末风险调整绩效，但面临奖金门槛风险的经理调整组合反而导致业绩恶化。
We study incentive contracts used by asset management firms in Norway, focusing on how bonus structures impact performance. The incentive contracts in our sample are heterogeneous, with firms rewarding fund managers based on both quantitative and qualitative targets. We find that higher potential bonuses tied to quantitative metrics, such as the information ratio, lead to better risk-adjusted performance at year-end. Managers at risk of missing bonus thresholds attempt to boost performance through portfolio adjustments, but these efforts backfire, resulting in worse outcomes in the latter part of the year.