Labour Market Power and the Effects of Fiscal Policy
提出劳动力市场买方垄断势力逆周期变化的新财政传导渠道，政府支出增加使企业对工人的市场势力减弱，从而放大财政乘数，并用实证验证了这一预测。
Abstract We propose a new fiscal transmission channel based on countercyclical monopsony power in the labour market. We develop a New Keynesian model incorporating a time-varying degree of monopsony power, with workers valuing various job aspects and firms having wage-setting power, inversely related to the elasticity of labour supply to individual firms. As government spending increases, labour supply to individual firms becomes more elastic, creating more competition and larger fiscal multipliers. We examine this channel’s interactions with other fiscal transmission channels. Finally, we confirm empirically the model’s prediction of reduced employer market power following government spending expansions.