A Note on “Corporate Provision of Public Goods”
指出Morgan和Tumlinson（2019）的一个主要结论——风险项目在所有颤抖手完美纳什均衡中都以正概率获得融资——并不总是成立，并证明了存在经济环境使得项目在所有此类均衡中都无法获得融资。
Morgan and Tumlinson (2019, Management Science 65(10), 4489–4504) study a game in which citizens first fund a company venture or purchase bonds, and then bondholders and the firm’s manager, acting on behalf of the shareholders, contribute to a public good. One of their major results is that the venture is funded with positive probability in all trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria. The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of economies in which the venture is not funded in all trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.