Financial Climate‐Risk Measurement, Impact Funds, and Green Transitions
研究发现，监管要求精确测量气候风险可能适得其反：企业会策略性地模糊测量以从影响力基金中套取更多补贴，反而导致清洁技术采用频率高于社会最优水平。
ABSTRACT Regulators are contemplating or mandating precise measurement of financial climate‐risk exposure to promote sustainable investments. We show that such mandates can be counterproductive in the presence of social funds that catalyze change by subsidizing the adoption of cleaner production technologies. Firms can exploit a social fund's impact motive by measuring their climate‐risk exposure imprecisely. This strategic imprecision prevents the fund from distinguishing between firms that require subsidies and those that would switch to clean technologies for financial reasons alone, thereby increasing the ex ante subsidies firms can extract. A by‐product of this rent‐seeking behavior is that firms adopt clean technologies more frequently than would be jointly efficient under precise measurement. Our analysis suggests that the regulatory push for precise climate‐risk measurement can reduce social funds' impact and the frequency of green transitions.