The incompatibility of the Condorcet winner and loser criteria with positive involvement and resolvability
证明了不存在一种偏好投票方法能同时满足孔多塞赢家和输家准则、正向参与（新增唯一支持某候选人的选民不会使其落败）以及n选民可解性（平局时可通过增加至多n名选民打破平局），该不可能性对任意正整数n成立。
We prove that there is no preferential voting method satisfying the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement (if a candidate x wins in an initial preference profile, then adding a voter who ranks x uniquely first cannot cause x to lose), and n -voter resolvability (if x initially ties for winning, then x can be made the unique winner by adding some set of up to n voters). This impossibility theorem holds for any positive integer n . It also holds if either the Condorcet loser criterion is replaced by independence of clones or positive involvement is replaced by negative involvement.