Payment Flows, Bank Lending, and Central Bank Digital Currencies
研究央行数字货币支付流的可观测性如何影响银行贷款和信用分配，发现适度可观测性可能导致低效的信贷配置，最优设计取决于CBDC对企业家收入的提升程度。
Abstract This paper examines the optimal observability of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) payment flows in the context of bank lending. Observability matters because lenders use borrowers' payment flows to enforce repayment, and the degree of visibility varies across payment instruments. When a CBDC is introduced alongside existing payment methods, we show that moderate observability in CBDC transactions may generate a pooling equilibrium that involves inefficient credit allocation. The optimal level of observability depends on how much CBDC increases entrepreneurs' revenues: When the benefit is modest, the socially optimal design is deposit‐like; when the benefit is large, it is cash‐like.