Analyst Rational Inattention: Evidence from CEO Turnover Events
研究了分析师在投资组合中某公司发生CEO更替时如何重新分配注意力，发现他们会将注意力转向发生事件的公司，导致对未发生事件公司的关注减少、预测准确性下降，且这种下降与理性分配注意力的成本收益因素相关。
ABSTRACT We consider the dynamics of analyst inattention by investigating how analysts allocate their attention when a firm in their portfolio experiences CEO turnover. Our analysis shows that analysts tend to divert their attention toward firms that experience such events, resulting in less attention and a corresponding reduction in forecasting accuracy for nonevent firms. Furthermore, this reduction in accuracy varies with factors related to the costs and benefits of rationally allocating attention to firms that have experienced CEO turnover. Collectively, our analysis responds to the call for research on rational inattention among analysts and illustrates the specific intraportfolio events that alter attention allocation and information. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; M12; M40; M41.