When scarcity intensifies conflict: On the role of asymmetry in common-pool resource games
通过动态公共池资源博弈实验，发现环境稀缺在对称条件下缓解冲突，但在不对称条件下不缓解，表明不对称资源使用会加剧稀缺引发的冲突。
Conflict over increasingly scarce resources such as freshwater, energy, arable land or wildlife has been identified as a major security threat in a world facing climate change. The literature suggests that asymmetric appropriation of resources facilitates such scarcity-related conflicts. We test this in a novel experimental design based on a dynamic common-pool resource game. In a 2x2 treatment design, we vary Asymmetry/Symmetry and Scarcity/Abundance. We induce Asymmetry by manipulating the perceived availability of the resource. Participants are nudged into high or low appropriations in the first round of the dynamic common-pool resource game. We implement Scarcity as environmental scarcity in the form of low reproduction rates of the renewable resource. Conflict is measured in a second stage of each round in a joy-of-destruction game. We find that environmental scarcity mitigates conflict under Symmetry, but not under Asymmetry. Our findings suggest that a world characterized by increasing scarcity might face exacerbated future conflicts if issues of asymmetric resource use are not properly addressed.