Audit or ratify? Supreme Court responses to presidential agency instructions
研究了总统对行政部门的指令如何影响最高法院对法律实施进行审查的概率，发现当法院不同意总统的执行议程时，审查和推翻的可能性更大。
Abstract Scholars recognize the variety of tools that Congress and presidents deploy to influence public policy. Less understood are the consequences of principals’ disagreement over policy implementation. Presidents direct agencies on how to interpret the law, often in conflict with the desires of Congress. Such disputes can serve as a cue for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene by reviewing statutory interpretation. Accordingly, our theory predicts that presidents’ instructions to the executive branch will increase the probability that a law’s implementation is reviewed by the Court, especially when agencies are under presidential control. Further, review and invalidation are more likely when the Court disagrees with the president’s implementation agenda. We find support for this theory by examining all laws passed, issued with an objecting presidential signing statement, and reviewed by the Court between 1981 and 2020. This study demonstrates the judiciary’s role in adjudicating interbranch disputes over the law while highlighting the limits of presidential policymaking.