Timing Isn't Everything: How Public Service and Self‐Serving Goals Influence Auditor Voice Tactics
研究发现审计师在向上级报告问题时，其公共服务或自利目标会影响他们选择何种策略来提升审计质量，且自利目标下的审计师可通过奖励机制改善策略选择。
ABSTRACT Auditors are required to raise potential audit issues to their supervisor's attention (i.e., to speak up). Speaking up allows supervisors to adjust audit procedures as needed to protect audit quality. We argue that the act of speaking up may not always be sufficient to protect audit quality— how auditors speak up is critical. Drawing on audit voice theory (AVT), which focuses on whether auditors speak up, we consider the impact of auditors' salient goals on the tactics that auditors use when raising issues. Using a survey, multiple experiments, and an association study, we find that staff auditors with salient public service (vs. self‐serving) goals choose more quality‐enhancing voice tactics when speaking up. Importantly, however, we find that the voice‐related decisions of auditors with salient self‐serving (but not public service) goals respond to rewards for more quality‐enhancing tactics. These results support our theory that auditors approach voice differently depending on their salient goals, and they imply that supervisors can help auditors choose quality‐enhancing voice tactics even when self‐serving goals are salient. Overall, our findings test and extend AVT, identify a potential shortcoming of current audit standards, and suggest ways that firms can improve team communication and audit quality via recruitment strategies, team management practices, and training.