Ownership Networks and Bid Rigging
利用新加坡公共采购数据和投标公司股东信息，研究发现共同所有者或共同所有者的所有者更可能提交相同报价，且相同报价与更高合同价格相关，去除所有权网络效应可提高采购成本效率。
Abstract Using a data set of public procurement auctions and registered shareholders of all bidding firms in Singapore, we study the effects of ownership networks on prices and efficiency in product markets. We find participating bidders with common owners or common owners’ owners are more likely to submit identical bids, and the identical bids are associated with higher contract prices. Our structural estimates suggest removing ownership network effects improves a procurer’s cost efficiency. Our findings are robust to falsification tests, bid rounding concerns, placebo tests using other common stakeholder relationships, and weighting based on a machine-learning prediction of the auction format.