Cooling Auction Fever: Evidence from the Housing Market
研究澳大利亚禁止低报价（listing price低于卖家保留价）的法律如何影响住房拍卖，发现法律提高了挂牌价但降低了成交价和成交概率，并通过模型和实证证据表明竞拍者过度出价的行为偏差是主要机制。
Abstract We study the effects of underquoting, the practice of setting listing prices below sellers’ reservation values, on housing auctions. Laws introduced in Australia to deter underquoting lead to higher listing prices, but also to declines in sales prices and sales probabilities. We develop a quantitative model to formalize predictions under different assumptions about bidders’ information and rationality. The effects of the laws are matched by a version of the model in which participating bidders overbid. While both behavioral biases arising during the auction and switching costs can explain overbidding, empirical and survey evidence points to behavioral biases as the main mechanism.