The effect of commission scheme in online marketplaces under various information scenarios
研究了平台和卖家拥有私人信息时，固定佣金与比例佣金两种方案在信息共享与否下的效果，发现固定佣金下卖家信息优势时平台偏好更精确信号，比例佣金下平台应分享信息并给固定比例。
Abstract The growing prevalence of online retailing has reshaped how marketplaces operate. This paper considers the case where a platform and a seller both receive signals (private information) that correlate with uncertain demand and may choose whether to share this information. The platform can adopt one of two commission schemes: fixed (a given sum for each unit sold) or proportional (a given percentage of the revenue). Specifically, this study deals with pure strategies and focuses on comparing commission schemes under different information scenarios (common information or information superiority of one of the parties). The main findings are: (i) Under the fixed commission scheme and information superiority of the seller, the platform always prefers a more informative signal. (ii) Under the proportional commission scheme, it is in the platform’s interest to share its private information with the seller and offer the seller a constant percentage that does not depend on the platform’s signal. (iii) In contrast to the proportional commission scheme, under fixed commission, the seller will refuse to play in some (private-signal determined) cases.