Do risky banks pay their employees more?
利用1990-2022年美国商业银行数据，研究发现银行风险越高（如盈利波动大、违约概率高），员工工资越高，这既是对工作不安全的补偿，也与资本充足带来的监督激励有关，尤其在小银行和低集中度市场中更明显。
This study examines how bank risk influences employee wage compensation, disentangling the effects of risk exposure and leverage. Using data from U.S. commercial banks (1990–2022), we find that higher bank risk—measured by earnings volatility, default probability, and credit risk—is associated with higher wages, alongside wage effects linked to monitoring incentives from greater capitalization. This relationship is most pronounced in smaller, less-capitalized banks, under favorable economic conditions, and when bank concentration is low—contexts where employees have greater bargaining power. Overall, bank wages reflect both compensation for job insecurity and monitoring-related incentives, offering insight into employee pay as a signal of bank fragility.