序贯诅咒均衡

Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

American Economic Review · 2026
被引 1 · 同刊同年前 6%
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

提出一种扩展式博弈解概念,玩家忽略假设事件的信息但能从观察到的事件中推断,修正了诅咒均衡并允许玩家对内生信息产生诅咒。

Abstract

We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information.

序贯诅咒均衡内生信息信息忽视博弈论