Managerial Intervention, Employee Motivation, and Collaboration
构建委托代理模型分析管理干预何时激励或打击员工，发现干预可能通过互补性努力提升激励，而授权在协作中可能降低激励。
The economic literature on delegation focuses on the subordinate’s improved motivation when liberated from managerial intervention in decision making. However, many managers motivate employees while proactively intervening in the decision-making process. We build a principal-agent model to analyze when managerial intervention is, and is not, motivational to the agent. Although managerial intervention may demotivate the agent when leading to actions that waste employee effort, managerial intervention can also motivate the agent by incentivizing principal effort that complements the agent’s effort. In fact, delegation may demotivate the agent when the principal and agent work collaboratively. Our results speak to understanding the role of strategic complementarity in determining when various managerial practices do, and do not, motivate employees. This paper was accepted by Maria Guadalupe, business strategy.