Eroding civic capital: how persistent organized crime diminishes tax compliance
利用意大利1950年代至2000年代的数据，研究发现有组织犯罪的持续存在会降低税收遵从，并通过企业渗透和勒索等机制发挥作用。
Abstract What is the long-term effect of organized crime presence on civic capital? By leveraging novel tax compliance and organized crime data, this study investigates this question within the Italian landscape from the 1950s to the 2000s. We exploit the forced resettlement law that compelled organized crime members living in the South of Italy to resettle in the Centre-North area of the country. Employing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, estimates reveal that sustained exposure to mafia presence reduces TV tax compliance. Exploring possible mechanisms, we find that municipalities exposed to the forced resettlement law show more firms in strategic sectors for organized crime infiltration, and more episodes of extortion and labor racketeering