Asymmetric and Contingent Value of Crowd Wisdom in Crowdfunding
利用中国借贷型众筹市场数据，发现投资者参与作为群体智慧信号能吸引借款人，但反之不成立；且该信号在正式风险指标显示高不确定性时作用更强。
Digital crowdfunding platforms operate under substantial uncertainty, where participants must assess platform viability with limited and imperfect information. Using data from the Chinese lending-based crowdfunding market, this study shows that platform growth depends not only on formal risk disclosures (e.g., interest rates, repayment ratios, and capitalization), but also on how users interpret the behavior of others as an informational signal. Specifically, we find that active user participation—particularly on the investor side—serves as a powerful form of “crowd wisdom” that shapes subsequent borrower participation, while borrower growth does not symmetrically attract investors. Importantly, the value of crowd-based signals is contingent: when formal risk indicators suggest greater uncertainty or weaker platform viability, users rely more heavily on observed participation by others; when risk signals are strong and favorable, the incremental influence of crowd cues diminishes. These findings offer several practical insights. Platform operators should recognize investor participation as a credibility signal and prioritize investor acquisition and retention, especially during periods of heightened uncertainty. Platform interface design and disclosure policies should balance formal risk information with transparent participation metrics, rather than treating them as substitutes. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that participation metrics can meaningfully shape user behavior even in the absence of misrepresentation, highlighting the need for regulators to consider how visibility rules, reporting standards, and disclosure requirements interact with social learning dynamics on digital financial platforms.