Contingent fees and tax compliance.
研究禁止税务申报准备服务中或有费用的影响，通过委托代理模型分析发现，禁止或有费用会提高从业者的预期费用，且费用增幅随从业者质量上升而增加；与普遍看法相反，允许或有费用反而减少了税收不合规。
Abstract This paper examines the effects of banning contingent fees for tax return preparation services. The paper presents a principal-agent model in which a taxpayer contracts with a tax practitioner to attempt to resolve tax law uncertainty. The optimal contract provides incentives for the practitioner to do research and to choose the tax return reporting position that the taxpayer prefers. Analysis of the model shows that banning contingent fees raises the expected fee of the practitioner. The amount of this increase is increasing in the quality of the practitioner Conventional wisdom holds that contingent fee arrangements will lead to an increase in tax undercompliance. In contrast, we find that undercompliance decreases when contingent fees are allowed.