Founder CEOs and firms' foreign subsidiary ownership: Do non-CEO executives matter?
基于高层梯队理论，以中国上市公司为样本，发现创始人CEO因风险偏好和过度自信而偏好更高海外子公司持股，且与非CEO高管的相似性、任期重叠和权力差距会强化这一影响。
Purpose Currently, the theoretical and empirical understanding of how founder chief executive officers (CEOs) influence foreign subsidiary ownership decisions is underdeveloped. This study aims to address this gap in research by examining the combined impact of founder CEOs and non-CEO executives on ownership decisions regarding foreign subsidiaries. Design/methodology/approach This study draws on upper echelons theory and relevant psychological literature to develop a conceptual framework to assess the joint influence of founder CEOs and non-CEO executives on firms' foreign subsidiary ownership. Accordingly, this study takes Chinese listed companies as samples and uses a Tobit model to empirically test the relevant theoretical hypotheses. Findings First, this study finds that founder status leads to a higher level of risk-taking and overconfidence among CEOs, which in turn leads to a preference for higher levels of foreign subsidiary ownership. Second, the results reveal that demographic similarity, tenure overlap and power disparity between founder CEOs and non-CEO executives enhance the positive influence of founder CEOs on firms' foreign subsidiary ownership. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on foreign subsidiary ownership by exploring the micro-foundations of ownership decisions and focusing on the role of founder CEOs, an area underexplored in prior research. Furthermore, by analysing the combined effect of CEOs and non-CEO executives on firms' foreign subsidiary ownership, this study advances upper echelons theory and contributes to the growing body of literature on the dynamics between CEOs and top management teams in strategic decision-making.