Fiscal capacity and executive constraints in early modern Europe
通过构建行政约束和财政能力的新历史指标，挑战了约束型政府与国家能力同步发展的传统观点，发现高财政能力可存在于无约束政府下，低财政能力也可存在于约束型政权下，并指出英格兰的独特之处在于约束型政府与高财政能力的结合，这有助于解释其现代经济增长的起飞。
Abstract According to the prevailing view of Europe’s political history, constrained government and state capacity developed in tandem. In this study, we reevaluate this perspective by constructing new historical indices for executive constraints and fiscal capacity. Our findings challenge the presumed connection, illustrating that high-capacity states existed under unconstrained government, and low-capacity states existed under constrained regimes. We also identify what made England historically distinctive: its political system stood out for combining constrained government with high fiscal capacity. This rare combination helps explain the eventual take-off of modern economic growth in England.