Blockchain-enabled transparency in low-carbon supply chains: a dynamic Stackelberg differential game approach
构建动态斯塔克尔伯格微分博弈模型，研究区块链投资如何通过提升透明度减少信息不对称和漂绿行为，发现区块链能使低碳企业长期市场份额增加15-20%、利润提高25%、广告成本降低30%。
This paper develops a dynamic Stackelberg differential game model, inspired by the classical Sethi advertising model, to address coordination and transparency challenges in low-carbon supply chains (LCSC). Recognising the strategic importance of blockchain-enabled transparency, we integrate blockchain investment decisions into a stochastic differential game model to examine how transparency reduces information asymmetry and greenwashing while enhancing sustainable competitiveness. We formulate a hierarchical supply chain comprising a low-carbon firm (LCF) as the leader and a high-carbon firm (HCF) as the follower, with pricing, advertising, and blockchain investment decisions evolving under uncertainty. The model extends Sethi's seminal contributions by incorporating blockchain-enabled transparency as a dynamic state variable that influences both demand and equilibrium coordination. The equilibrium results show that blockchain-enabled transparency increases the LCF's long-term market share by approximately 15–20%, improves profitability by up to 25%, and reduces advertising costs by 30% compared to non-blockchain scenarios. Numerical simulations confirm that the benefits of blockchain are most pronounced when transparency and communication are jointly optimised. The findings provide theoretical and managerial insights into how blockchain-enabled transparency can help firms achieve both competitiveness and sustainability in low-carbon supply chains.