Impartial observer theorem with ambiguity
将模糊性引入公正观察者框架，构建了介于哈萨尼功利主义与罗尔斯最大最小规则之间的连续折中立场，探讨不同不确定性类型和程度对公正观察者偏好表示的影响。
This paper revisits the debate between Harsanyi and Rawls on collective decision-making with impartiality (Veil of Ignorance), focusing on how different levels of uncertainty influence the resulting social welfare functions. By incorporating ambiguity into the Impartial Observer framework, the paper constructs a continuum of compromise positions between Harsanyi’s utilitarian approach and Rawls’s maximin rule. In the proposed model, the independence between the uncertainty faced by the Impartial Observer over the distributions of identities and the uncertainty faced by each individual over the distributions of outcomes allows us to introduce ambiguity on both identity acts and/or outcome acts to explore various configurations where the Impartial Observer’s preference representation changes based on the type and level of uncertainty considered. The results offer a more nuanced understanding of impartiality in social choice contexts and help clarify the philosophical foundations of the Harsanyi–Rawls debate.