Global public good agreements with fixed costs
研究固定成本如何改变全球公共品合作中的激励，使广泛且有效的国际协议既稳定又能提升福利，从而缓解“合作悖论”。
Abstract International cooperation to provide global public goods is often weak: coalitions tend to be small, or, when large coalitions form, the resulting welfare gains are limited—a result known as the ‘paradox of cooperation’. We revisit this issue by analyzing a two-stage coalition formation game in which contributing to a global public good involves not only variable costs but also fixed upfront costs. This cost structure fundamentally alters cooperation incentives. Fixed costs can generate corner provision outcomes and qualitatively different coalition formation scenarios. Depending on their magnitude, fixed costs can alter the ‘paradox of cooperation’ by making broad and effective international agreements both stable and welfare-enhancing.