Circularity Governance Under Strategic Incentives: A Stackelberg Model of Wind Turbine Blade Recycling
研究了风力涡轮机叶片回收中制造商与回收商的博弈，发现闭环系统能内生奖励生态设计，但风险规避和市场竞争会削弱这一机制，并提出了确保闭环稳定的补贴阈值。
ABSTRACT Circular economy goals under the European Green Deal require business models that make recyclability financially attractive, yet this alignment becomes fragile when eco‐design effort is hidden and secondary‐market prices are volatile. This paper develops a formal model of the wind‐turbine blade (WTB) value chain to examine when closed‐loop systems can internalise eco‐design incentives. In a Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a recycler, we show that reintegrating recovered glass fibre reinforced polymer (GFRP) into new WTBs can endogenously reward eco‐design by linking material recovery to cost savings. However, this self‐alignment weakens under risk aversion and competitive leakage, when recyclers divert material to more profitable external markets. We derive a robustness‐adjusted subsidy threshold that ensures closed‐loop stability and quantify how it varies with eco‐design leverage, price uncertainty and technology choice. Numerical results for pyrolysis and solvolysis highlight how technological maturity and market risk shape feasibility.