Reserve Price Signaling With Public Information: Evidence From Online Auto Auctions
研究了卖家在在线汽车拍卖中通过保留价格传递私有质量信号的行为，发现信号动机降低卖家收益和成交概率，而秘密保留价格可消除信号动机并改善结果。
ABSTRACT This article considers an auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show that the signaling incentive would lower the seller's payoff and the probability of sale. We estimate the model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. Counterfactual simulations suggest that a secret reserve price could shut down the signaling incentive and improve both the seller's payoff and the probability of sale, which supports the prevalent use of secret reserve prices in practice.