Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements
利用美国州界规则的不连续性，发现失业保险的工龄和收入要求均降低失业，但工龄要求增加雇主数量和兼职比例而收入要求相反，并量化了最优的功利主义失业保险设计。
ABSTRACT In the United States, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that both requirements reduce unemployment and that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part‐time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. We develop a heterogeneous agents model with history‐dependent UI benefits to explain these results and quantify an optimal utilitarian UI design. The optimal policy has a high monetary and a short tenure requirement.