Accounting Enforcement and Bank Transparency under Hierarchical Supervision in a Banking Union
研究欧洲银行联盟中，银行如何应对欧洲央行与地方监管者的偏好冲突，发现银行自愿调整报告以符合新中央监管者的非约束性偏好，增强了贷款损失准备的信息含量。
ABSTRACT Banks often adjust their financial reporting in response to supervisory intervention. However, many banks operate under multiple supervisors with varying preferences. We examine how banks respond to such conflicting oversight within the European Banking Union, where the European Central Bank (ECB) is the central authority. The ECB’s Asset Quality Review revealed that its preferred asset valuations diverged from many banks’ IFRS-compliant practices that were previously accepted by local supervisors. Banks voluntarily aligned their reporting with the nonbinding preferences of the new central supervisor, although the adjustments varied across jurisdictions. Alignment was weaker when central and local supervisory objectives conflicted and stronger when joint supervision mitigated regulatory capture. Overall, these adjustments enhanced the informativeness of loan loss provisioning. With aligned reporting preferences across supervisory layers, the introduction of a central supervisor can thus significantly improve bank reporting and transparency, even without formal enforcement. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources identified in the manuscript. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G20; G21; G28.