Reshaping coopetition: strategic sharing of the semiconductor manufacturing supply chain risk management capabilities
研究了半导体制造商在竞合关系下是否应开放供应链风险管理平台并共享能力，发现即使供应商带来的收益低于成本，制造商有时仍会开放平台，且能力共享在特定条件下可实现双赢。
As global supply chains become increasingly complex, it is vital to enhance the resilience of semiconductor manufacturing supply chains for sustainable development. We focus on the strategic choice of the semiconductor manufacturer to improve resilience by opening the supply chain risk management (SCRM) platform and sharing its capabilities. In practice, semiconductor manufacturers typically procure semi-finished products from semiconductor suppliers, who also compete with manufacturers in the downstream market. This coopetitive relationship introduces additional complexity into the manufacturer's sharing decision. To analyze this dynamic, we develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the optimal sharing decision. First, our study finds that even when the revenue from the supplier's access is lower than the costs incurred from access, the semiconductor manufacturer sometimes still opens the platform. Then, the semiconductor manufacturer may invest more in the platform even when the product value is relatively low. Additionally, while accessing the platform improves the supplier's technical performance, capability sharing constitutes a win–win strategy only under certain conditions. Furthermore, capability sharing may lead to improvements in both customer surplus and social welfare. Our findings provide valuable insights for semiconductor manufacturers' decisions on SCRM capability sharing, suppliers' response mechanisms, and relevant policy formulation.