Scrutinising Frontex: The European Parliament and Accountability through Discharge
研究了欧洲议会如何利用预算执行程序，超越财务监督，增强对欧盟边境管理局Frontex的政治问责，揭示了议会通过非正式手段扩大监督权力的过程。
Abstract This article examines how the European Parliament (EP) has leveraged the budgetary discharge procedure to enhance the political accountability of the EU's Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. Whilst the procedure is formally limited to budget implementation, the EP has used it as an accountability tool that goes far beyond financial oversight, addressing broader issues such as fundamental rights and operational effectiveness. Employing a rationalist bargaining perspective on institutional change, the article highlights the EP's use of strategies to compensate for its lack of formal oversight powers. Based on systematic document analysis and original interview material, the findings reveal how the EP has significantly expanded the scope of the discharge procedure over time, thus increasing its de facto scrutiny powers. The analysis of this informal ‘self‐empowerment’ shows how the EP can enhance the political accountability of increasingly powerful EU agencies even if it lacks formal competences.