Unanimity versus majority: proposing under incomplete information
研究不完全信息下一致同意与多数决的权衡，发现提案者不确定接受者成本时，两种规则的效果与常识相反，为欧盟投票改革争论提供新视角。
Abstract We examine the trade-offs between unanimity and majority voting under incomplete information. While conventional wisdom suggests that unanimity leads to higher reform rejection rates and higher total transfers compared to the majority rule, we show that this does not always hold when the proposer lacks perfect knowledge of responders’ acceptance costs. Using a simple theoretical model, we identify conditions under which uncertainty leads the proposer to adopt different bargaining behaviors, sometimes resulting in a higher probability of reform approval under unanimity rule, and sometimes yielding higher total transfers under majority rule. Our findings inform the current EU debate on replacing unanimity with majority voting and provide nuanced insights into the arguments advanced by each side.