Search, Acute Illness, and Absenteeism
研究了急性疾病导致的缺勤的经济成本，通过扩展搜索匹配模型并利用MEPS数据估计，发现急性疾病降低生产率、增加医疗支出并减少福利，而补贴健康资本或实施惩罚性医保政策能提升福利。
<h3>Abstract</h3> This paper examines the economic costs of absenteeism from acute illness, which reduces labor market participation and burdens workers and firms. I extend a search, matching, and bargaining framework to incorporate medical care use, illness dynamics, health capital, and employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I estimate the model and find that acute illness lowers productivity, raises medical expenditures, and reduces welfare. Counterfactual analyses show subsidizing health capital improves total welfare. Moreover, while both a universal ESHI mandate and a penaltybased policy expand coverage, the penalty-based approach yields greater welfare gains.