Decentralized Choice of Monitoring Systems.
构建了一个代理模型，当代理人掌握企业生产技术私有信息时，委托人可能理性地偏好将监控系统的选择权委托给代理人，即使代理人的报酬依赖于监控信息。模型表明，存在多种会计方法并将选择权下放给管理层可能是理性均衡行为。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper presents an agency model in which one of several monitoring systems can be chosen, if the agent possesses private information about the firm's production technology, the principal may rationally prefer to delegate the choice of the monitor to the agent even though the agent's compensation will depend on the monitoring information. In general, this expansion of the contracting space allows the principal to orchestrate more efficiently the agent's effort and monitoring system choices. The model suggests that the existence of alternative accounting methods and the delegation of their selection to management may represent rational equilibrium behavior.