The influence of institutional investors in myopic R&D investment behavior.
研究机构投资者是否影响企业管理者为满足短期盈利目标而削减研发支出的行为，发现机构整体持股高时管理者更少短视，但高换手率、动量交易的机构持股高时反而加剧短视。
Abstract This paper examines whether institutional investors create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (R&D) to meet short-term earnings goats. Many critics argue that the frequent trading and short-term focus of institutional investors encourages managers to engage in such myopic investment behavior Others argue that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutions allow managers to focus on long-term value rather than on short-term earnings. I examine these competing views by testing whether institutional ownership affects R&D spending for firms that could reverse a decline in earnings with a reduction in R&D. The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions are sophisticated investors who typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behavior However, I find that a large proportion of ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover arid engage in momentum trading significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to reverse an earnings decline. These results indicate that high turnover and momentum trading by institutional investors encourages myopic investment behavior when such institutional investors have extremely high levels of ownership in a firm; otherwise, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment behavior.