The Self-Selection and Effort Effects of Standard-Based Employment Contracts: A Framework and Some Empirical Evidence.
构建了一个研究基于标准的雇佣合同如何通过自选择和努力影响工人绩效的框架，并通过实验验证了相关假设，对理解合同设计与工人行为的关系有参考价值。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper presents a framework for empirical research on the self-selection and effort effects on worker performance of standard-based employment contracts, along with the results of an experiment that tests some hypotheses derived within the framework. The framework examines how personal and contract attributes (or a worker's perceptions of them) affect the self-selection process and how self-selection and effort are interdependent. The experimental results were consistent with these hypotheses: workers select among alternative employment contracts based on their performance capability, the correlation between performance capability and performance incentives in the contract selected is higher in the presence of a controllability filter, and contract selection can explain effort effects.