The choice of performance measures in annual bonus contracts.
研究CEO奖金合同中财务与非财务绩效指标相对权重的影响因素，发现监管水平、创新战略、质量举措和财务指标噪音会提高非财务指标的使用，而财务困境和CEO持股价值则无显著影响。
Abstract This paper examines the factors influencing the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus con- tracts. We find that the use of non-financial measures increases with the level of regulation, the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives, and the noise in financial measures. We find no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to salary and bonus. Our results also provide no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the board of directors are more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures.