The Economic Theory of Regulation: Evidence from the Uniform CPA Examination.
利用加州和伊利诺伊州统一注册会计师考试的时间序列数据，检验了职业许可考试评分标准是否随经济周期变化以保护现有从业者，发现各州自行评分时失败率随失业率上升而增加，但采用AICPA咨询评分服务后无此关系。
Abstract The economic theory of regulation suggests that occupational licensing laws are enacted and administered to advance the interests of licensed practitioners. For example, grading standards on licensing examinations could be altered to protect incumbent practitioners from new competitors. This possibility is investigated with time series data of Uniform CPA Examination results for California and Illinois. The results indicate that when the exam was graded by the individual states, exam failure rates increased with downturns in economic activity (as measured by unemployment rates). However, the evidence shows no statistical relation between failure rates and economic activity in the years after each of the states adopted the AICPA's Advisory Grading Service.