Rational Economic Behavior and Lobbying on Accounting Issues: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry.
研究管理层在石油天然气会计方法上的游说行为，发现合同限制和现金流效应是预测游说的稳定因素，对理解会计政策选择有参考价值。
Abstract ABSTRACT: A substantial accounting research literature seeks to explain the existence of alternative accounting methods and management's willingness to expend efforts lobbying to defend alternate methods. This paper investigates the association between management lobbying on accounting for oil and gas producing activities and the effect that the method may have on firm cash flows and on accounting numbers that are restricted by the terms of firm contracts, Full cost companies that lobbied at different stages of the deliberations on oil and gas accounting are compared with those that did not. The models and their classificatory success rates were statistically significant. Also, the models developed at each stage of the rule-making process provided statistically significant predictions for the other stages. This suggests that the contract and cash flow effects were stable predictors of lobbying by managers.