Coalition Formation in the APB and the FASB: A Reply.
回应Anderson对作者先前关于APB和FASB中联盟形成研究的评论，辩护规模原则及其检验方法，讨论模型假设、方法论问题及联盟形成的简化性质。
Abstract The article presents the author's response to comments on his paper "Coalition Formation in the APB and FASB: Some Evidence on the Size Principle," by accounting expert James A. Anderson. These comments given by Anderson are partitioned into two major areas and the article provide a few general arguments in defense of the size principle and the particular investigation. In particular, topics including assumptions of the model and methodological issues on observation of coalitions, specifying payoffs and operationalizing tendency seem to capture the major points. The article also provides some remarks regarding the simplistic nature of the size principle versus more developed models of coalition formation based on policy dimensions. Anderson raises a number of points regarding the conditions required to test the predictions of the size principle and the information and threat effects. Some concerns are over the surrogates utilized in the tests. These comments focus on the inability to observe a winning coalition, the nature of a "tendency" toward minimum winning coalitions and the payoffs to participants in the standard-setting process.