The Impacts of Accounting Regulation on Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of the Securities Acts.
研究1933年和1934年证券法如何通过增加财务披露和限制会计选择，影响债券持有人和股东财富，发现1933年法案减少了股东财富，但对债券持有人财富有微弱正面影响。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This study shows that the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts significantly, and unexpectedly, increased firms' required financial disclosure while curtailing their accounting alternatives. These constraints are postulated to have affected the nature of outstanding bondholder-shareholder contracts and the future costs of entering into such contracts. These changes are hypothesized to have affected bondholder and shareholder wealth through shareholder-to-bondholder wealth transfers, modifying firms' investment, financing, and production opportunity sets, reducing shareholder-bondholder contracting costs, and through wealth transfers across firms. Empirical tests were performed on daily stock and bond returns during the deliberation period of each Act. The sample consisted of New York Stock Exchange stocks and bonds, and over-the-counter stocks. The evidence is consistent with the '33 Act having reduced shareholder wealth through interfirm wealth transfers, out-of-pocket compliance costs, and reduced opportunity sets. The evidence weakly suggests that the '33 Act enhanced bondholder wealth. However, this effect does not appear to have been due to a wealth transfer from shareholders. There is no evidence of a significant effect due to the '34 Act.