Joint Cost Allocation: A Unified Approach.
提出一种统一方法解决联合成本分配问题，结合Moriarity和Louderback方案的优点，利用博弈论中的修正Shapley值，确保分配结果在核心中。
Abstract ABSTRACT: In this article, the authors provide a unified approach to joint cost allocation for situations where allocation is needed. First, with the help of an illustration, the apparent weakness of Moriarity's scheme is discussed. Later, certain desirable properties of Louderback's method are shown. Employing their "propensity to contribute" concept, the authors utilize the desirable aspects of both the Moriarity and the Louderback schemes to come up with a model which is shown to be in the core. With game-theoretic concepts, a "modified Shapley Value" to allocate the joint cost is provided.