The Effects of Job Standard Tightness and Compensation Scheme on Performance: An Exploration of Linkages.
通过实验室实验，研究工作标准严格性和薪酬方案如何影响工人努力、自我选择及最终绩效，发现两者独立影响绩效，且允许自选薪酬方案能提升绩效。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This study explores the linkages among job standard tightness, type of compensation scheme, and performance. It postulates that job standard tightness and type of compensation scheme affect not only workers' effort, but also their self-selection among employment contracts, and through these, job performance. A laboratory experiment yielded the following results: among subjects with assigned treatments, job standard tightness and type of compensation scheme had significant independent, but insignificant interactive effects on performance. Subjects who were permitted to choose their own compensation schemes (given an assigned job standard) self-selected among these by skill. There was also some indication that being able to select one's own compensation scheme, per se, enhanced performance. If supported by future studies, these results suggest that job standards and compensation schemes may affect performance not just by motivating a given set of employees, but also by affecting the type of employees an organization attracts from the labor market.