The Interaction Between Decision and Control Problems and the Value of Information.
研究双重道德风险下信息系统设计，发现提供较少公共信息的信息系统可能更优，因为它能替代委托人的承诺，但代价是决策和支付无法基于该信息。
Abstract This paper studies information system design in a model of double moral hazard in which there is both a decision problem and a control problem. If either problem is considered in isolation, an information system that provides more public information is preferred. However, an information system that provides less public information can, in fact, be desirable because of an interaction between the two problems. The benefit of choosing an information system that provides less information is that it serves as a substitute for commitment for the principal. The cost is that neither the principal's decision (act) nor the agent's payments can be conditioned on the information. We provide sufficient conditions under which less information and more information are each optimal.