Lobbying Activities and Insider Trading.
检验企业针对会计准则（FAS No.19）的游说活动与内部人交易行为的关系，发现游说方向与内部人交易方向一致，支持游说具有信息价值或管理层财富预期的假设。
Abstract ABSTRACT: This study testa whether there is a relationship between the lobbying activities of firms on a proposed accounting standard (FAS No. 191 and the trading activities of corporate insiders. We find that, on average, insiders of full cost firms that lobbied were net sellers and successful efforts lobbiers were net buyers, while non-lobbiers took opposite positions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that lobbying activity is correlated with management's expected wealth. The results are also consistent with comment letters to the FASB having information value, since insider, trade on their personal account in the same direction their firms lobby. Alternatively, the results can be interpreted as support for the conclusion of Larcker, Reder and Simon [1983] that FAS No. 19 was perceived to have economic consequences.