The Five-Year Accounting Program as a Quality Signal.
探讨会计劳动力供给方提供额外一年会计教育的经济激励，并评估强制五年制教育要求对会计劳动力市场的影响，将教育视为雇主在信息不对称市场中预测员工生产力的质量信号。
Abstract ABSTRACT: Recently, several state legislators have supported the imposition of a mandatory five-year accounting education requirement for entrance into the public accounting profession. This has occurred despite controversy over the efficacy of such a proposal. This paper explores the economic incentives of accounting labor suppliers in providing an extra year of accounting education, and evaluates the ramifications of an imposed five-year minimum education requirement upon the accounting labor market. Education will be presented as a quality signal from which potential employers can predict employee productivity in markets characterized by information asymmetry.